An Infants Innate Proximity Seeking Behaviour Psychology Essay

An Infants Innate Proximity Seeking Behaviour Psychology Essay Bowlbys classical attachment theory (1969/ 1982, 1973) is an ethological theory emphasising the regulatory functions of an infants innate proximity-seeking behaviours directed towards their primary caregiver. Fundamentally, it classifies the infant-caregiver relationship as the foundation of an infants future social development and further ability to form relationships. Bowlby believed that a childs attachment with its caregiver governs the development of internal working models (or mental representations) which the child subsequently applies to relationships with other people and in general, the social world. In turn he proposed that by determining the nature of an infants attachment with their caregiver (considered primarily to be the mother in this case), an infants future social behaviour patterns could be predicted i.e. certain attachment types would lead to certain behaviour types as a result of these internal working models (1973). Attachment types were formally assessed via t he Strange Situation experiment (Ainsworth et al. 1978), out of which three basic types were discerned: the secure and the insecure: anxious/ambivalent and insecure: avoidant. A fourth attachment style insecure: disorganised was later included, encompassing an insecure attachment style which couldnt reliably be characterised as either anxious or avoidant (Van Ijzendoorn et al.; 1999). Attachment theory is intrinsically relevant to psychoanalysis; being characterised as an attempt to update classical psychoanalysis (otherwise lacking empirical evidence; Kihlstrom, 1999), in light of advancements in evolutionary biology and cognition (Ainsworth et al. 1978, Schore Schore, 2008). Fonagy (***) has extensively outlined the commonalties of both; fundamentally, both theoretical perspectives class anxiety as engendered by loss and postulate a non-isomorphic relationship to exist between (mental) representations and their external referents whereby the former moreso reflect the psychic reality from which the latter are perceived. Related to this, Fonagy has likened the internal working models (IWM) of attachment theory to the mental representations (MR) of psychoanalysis, further distinguishing them by highlighting that the IWM are processed implicitly as opposed to explicitly (MR) and are stored in procedural as opposed to episodic memory (MR). Additionally, in both, personality development is conceived as most primarily a function of early social context, where infancy is a potent period of intense growth and the importance of the maternal figure is emphasised. The development of mentalisation (in Fonagys terms) which is akin to a theory of mind, or set of empathic-based processes is also key for growth in both. Finally, both Freud (1895) and Bowlby (1963) emphasised the role of early trauma in later vulnerability to psychopathology. While many are reticent in accepting the implications of attachment theory and the possible anti-therapeutic effects of the labelling ethos it subscribes to (***), its cogency is difficult to deny considering its wide base of empirical support and its enduring legacy. The latter point is fortified by the well-documented recent resurgence of classical attachment theory initiated by the rise of neuroscience (the decade of the brain) and its transformation into modern attachment theory (Slater, 2007) . Specifically, it can be said to underscore the advent of neuropsychoanalysis (a branch of interpersonal neurobiology; Siegal, 2001; Schore Schore, 2008); an assimilation of neuroscientific and psychoanalytic principles. With such links and terms thus established, the ensuing aim of this essay is to outline the modern re-conceptualisation of attachment theory, which draws on neuroscience and forges a link between psychoanalysis and mainstream science. The neurobiological components underlying attachment will be outlined and discussed in relation to affect regulation. The subtext of the essay will be the implicit relevance of psychoanalysis and its use for modern practice which contrapose condemnations of it as being theoretically dead (i.e. Kihlstrom, 1999). According to Whitehead (2006), psychoanalysis has undergone three major revolutions (currently in its third) since its inception, namely the Classical-Freudian, Post-Freudian and the third, currently wheeling, revolution characterised by a return to the project of mind-body integration which Freud abandoned. Indeed, while the likes of Freud eschewed neurological findings from theories of self and personality (vowing to stick with the psychological realm) a number of psychoanalytically minded researchers are reconciling the two to form a field of research coined neuropsychoanalysis (Schore, 2002), which implicitly underlines mind-body integration in accordance with psychoanalytic principles via appeal to attachment theory and neuroscience; undergoing periods of resurgence and dominance, respectively, as of late (Slater, 2007). The advent of neuropsychoanalysis has also coincided with a new appraisal of the problem regarding the interface between outer reality and the inner fantasy wor lds of the individual which Freud found problematic (Whitehead, 2006) reflected in the shift from one-person to two-person psychology (Pulver, 2001) arguably based on the advent and predominance of object relations theory propounded most evidently by Klein and Winnicott. The fundamental point of object relations was an emphasis on the role of interpersonal interactions in the development of personality and mind. The self psychology of Kohut (1957*) is in some ways an offshoot of object relations theory and engenders the most fertile and evident link between psychoanalysis and attachment theory; specifically considering that it has been taken as the basis for many explications of the neurophysiological underpinnings of the attachment process (i.e. Schore Schore, 2002; Shore, 2008; 1994). As explicated by Schore Schore (2002), Kohuts self-psychology concerns itself with four fundamental issues: 1) the emergence of self 2) the structuring of self 3) the genesis of psychopathology as a function of deficits in the structure of self and 4) the manifold manner in which psychotherapy may instigate change in the self. All of such issues have been addressed explicitly via modern attachment theory and its neurobiological underpinnings, the first three of which will be focussed on here. Most significantly, the other is required for the emergence of self (i.e. intersubjectivity engenders subjectivity). For Kohut coupling with the self-object (i.e. the primary caregiver) facilitates affect regulation and the establishment of internal homeostatic equilibrium which precedes (structuring of) burgeoning selfhood. This reflects the aforementioned two-person psychology which characterises the current revolution of psychoanalysis; most apparent in (modern) attachment theory which will subsequently be discussed in greater detail. The main aim of the first year of life is to form an attachment with the primary care-giver which will facilitate subsequent emergence of self and the optimal psychobiological development. To accommodate this is an innate, attachment behavioural system which manifests in a number of instinctual behaviours (or attachment strategies) undertaken by the infant in an attempt to form such an attachment (Siegal, 2001). The primary attachment strategy engaged in by the infant is proximity-seeking; in moments of distress or threat the infants seeks out the primary caregiver as a source of security and comfort (Mikulincer, Sahver and Pereg, 2003). Attachment is achieved, whilst proximate to the caregiver, via inter-subjective interactions (engagement) with the self-object (attachment figure) through affect-laden face to face interactions not strictly limited to visual stimulation (i.e. gaze episodes) but multi-modal (i.e. all senses implicated) emotional transactions. Evidencing the innate ca pacity to engage in such interactions are studies demonstrating infants as young as 12 days old imitating facial expressions (Eltzoff Moore, 1977) and making facial movements in response to communications from the mother expressions which, coupled with those of the mother, assist interpersonal contact and affect regulation (Trevarther, 1985). The sensitivity and responsiveness of the self-object are pivotal for optimal attachment sensitivity inheres that the self-object will recognise when engagement and affect regulation are required (i.e. in times of distress) while responsiveness entails a successful interpretation of social cues, regarding affect, as provided by the infant. The self-object, if sensitive and responsive, may facilitate the minimisation of negative affect and the increase of positive affect, that is, regulation of the infants affect-states a process which gradually become internalised by the infant (Schore Schore, 2008). This occurs as a function of appropriate, consistent responses to such social cues (affect synchrony) permitting the development of mechanisms of anticipation the infant learns of a correspondence between their own actions and the responses of others (and will begin to gauge just how their affects/experiences may be regulated). This in turn facilitates a self-other distinction to be made in which internal working models of the self and the self-object are constructed, engendering processes through which the infant may begin to modify their own behaviour in light of their dyadic interactions with the self-object. As I see it, these processes effectively pre-empt the emergence of subjective consciousness. Particularly, Lipton et al (1999) has associated the development of orbito-frontal systems at this time of development with the infants integration of past, present and future experiences; which permits anticipation of future states of self and reflection on past states. In phenomeno logical terms, this manifests as the emergence of temporality; one of the fundamental tenets and characterisations of intentionality (i.e. consciousness; Husserl, 1952). This may be considered the foundation of the self, corroborating with self-reflexivity (i.e. the establishment of an internal working model of the temporal self) which emerges at this time in line with the above assertions of Liptons. Indeed Slater (2007) has suggested that this marks the beginning of an internalisation of the attachment figure i.e. the accessing of IWM/ MR of the self-object facilitates anticipation of future events and their instantiation of affect regulation. More specifically, as will be discussed, the process of internalising the schematics produced via the dyadic relationship with the self-object become to be gradually subsumed under the rubric of self. That is, the constellation of beliefs structured around representations of self and other bear affect regulation strategies which are elicited in future times of distress. Should such beliefs reflect an unavailability or insufficiency of response from the self-object, secondary attachment strategies are cultivated which manifest attempts at affect regulation other than aforementioned proximity-seeking (Mikulincer et al. 2003). To explicate this point further, comprising the in-born attachment behavioural system (Mikulincer, Sahver and Pereg, 2003) are a number of dynamic processes which govern which set of attachment strategies will be engaged in. These processes comprise of the infants monitoring and appraisal of: a) events (deeming whether or not theyre threatening), b) the availability of the attachment figure and c) the viability of proximity seeking as a means of dealing with a possibly threatening situation. Should an event be appraised as threatening, the infant considers whether or not the attachment figure is available. If the attachment figure is deemed unavailable, secondary attachment strategies classed as deactivating are implemented (characterising the avoidant attachment style). If the attachment figure is deemed available but non-responsive or insufficient in their engagement (i.e. inefficient in their affect regulation), secondary strategies classed as hyper-activating are employed (consti tuting the anxious attachment style). Finally if they are appraised as available and responsive, proximity seeking behaviour is undertaken as already outlined and engagement takes place (secure attachment). According to Dozier and Lee (1995) corresponding to each specific attachment style is a schema for appraisal of ones own self-concept, whereby insecure attachments lead to distortions in such appraisals whilst secure attachments manifest as appraisals of self as worthy and lovable (Schore, 1994) . Namely the avoidant strategies instigate a denial of feelings of distress when they arise while those of the anxious category amplify such feelings. In line with this characterisation it might be suggested that such appraisals lead to re-enforcement of such schemas which consequently persist into later life. Indeed, the continuity of attachment styles, from infancy onwards, according to Mikulincer et al. (2003) is grounded in the inhibitory/excitatory network which accompanies the activation of attachment strategies. Specifically, implementation of hyper-activating strategies acts to increase sensitivity to later threatening event appraisal and evaluation of the availability of the attachment figure, whereby innocuous events are more likely to be deemed threatening and greater attempts to elicit responses from the attachment figure are made. The resultant state of hyperarousal (****) manifests in an over-zealous urgency to be close to the attachment figure. The deactivating strategies on the other hand desensitise the individual to appraising events as threatening and similarly decrease the likelihood of appraisals of the AF as being available. This manifests in a sort of dissociativeness (***); the individual disavows concern as to whether or not a figure is available from which they mi ght garner support and comfort. Due to previous frustration with the stress-response system, arising from it not being adequately handled, the avoidant infant acts to deactivate it altogether (Cassidy Kobak, 1988). Consistent with the neuropsychoanalytic approach; the neurobiological underpinnings of such a system are evident through appeal to the intense synaptic growth (neuron overproduction) experienced in the brain during early infancy (Siegal, 2001). Specifically during the earlier periods of infancy synaptic pruning occurs driven by environmental interaction. In a use it or lose it fashion those connections which are not implemented are pruned away under the guise that they are not needed in the current environment; those that are, are fortified, fine-tuned and maintained. As such it is considered that interpersonal experiences directly shape genetically driven unfolding of the human brain (p72, Siegal, 2001). In this manner it is readily conceivable as to how early interpersonal experiences shape cognitive and affective processes which consequently persist into later periods of life. Schore (1994) has localised processes underlying the attachment process further, namely implicating attachment in the development of the right-brain, the neurobiological core of human consciousness. According to Schore (2001), the right brain dominant in infancy- houses the developing limbic system and remains the hemisphere most dominant for stress response throughout life due to its links to the autonomic nervous system, which regulates the somatic aspects of stressor responses i.e. fight or flight. To this extent, engagement between the infant and caregiver is characterised by a coupling of the AFs right brain with the infants right brain the consequent transactions are non-verbal, affect laden and intrinsically informative of the shaping of the unconscious (Schore Schore, 2008). Psychoanalytic principles are thus represented insomuch that components of the right brain operate at a free-associative, non-verbal and unconscious level (indeed Schore has emphasised that psychotherapy implicitly involves a connecting of clients right brain to therapists right brain) and implicitly exerts influence, as will be outlined presently, on the processes of cognition (Schore Schore, 2008). Indeed, the right hemisphere has been involved in the storage of information pertaining to the emotional ties we have to certain experiences and events (Shuren Grafman, 2002). Accordingly, encountering familiar events leads to a recall of related non-verbal, non-conscious emotional content which further instigate specific reasoning processes which are implemented in the appraisal of such experiences. The link between affect and cognition is well documented and another field of research which modern attachment theory and neuropsychoanalysis forge a mutually-beneficial tie with (Robins Zacks**). Specifically, research from the field of affective cognitive neuroscience has shown that the neural circuits involved in cognition overlap and intertwine with those involved in affect (emotion) (****); as suggested by modern attachment theory. As such, taking this into consideration we can validly assert, through inference, the role attachment strategies/behaviours play on engendering particular patterns of cognition i.e. attachment effects (and affects) cognition (Mikulincer et al. 2003) . Studies by Mikulincer Sheffi (2000) and Pereg (2001) demonstrate, for example, that inducement of negative affect leads to a greater recall of positive thoughts amongst securely attached than those who are anxiously attached, who conversely recall significantly less positive cognitions and significantly greater negative thoughts indicating the amplification of negative affect input and its pervasive effects in the brain suffusing regions of working memory and cognition. Meanwhile, in both studies, cite the authors, those who were avoidant in their attachment styles demonstrated no particular differences in cognitive functioning as a result of positive or negative affect inducement; supporting the hypothesis that those of the avoidant category tend to dismiss and dissociate themselves from sources of distress. To further propound these points, Gillath et al (2005) found that attachment-related anxiety positively correlated with the activation of emotion-implicated areas of the brain and inversely correlated with the activation of areas involved in affect regulation (i.e. the orbito-frontal cortex); paralleling ties between anxious attachment and distress amplification/affect dysregulation (Dozier and Lee, 1995). Furthermore, coinciding with Schores (2002) emphasis on the right brain as centre of self and regulatory/ stress response systems, affective disorders such as depression and dysthymic personality traits have links with the right hemisphere of the brain. Liotti Tucker (1992) for example document that depression interferes with the functions of right hemisphere activity by influencing its arousal mechanisms. Related to this point, a plethora of studies support both Freud and Bowlbys assertions that early insecure attachments increase vulnerability to later psychopathology; specifically whereas the internalisation of affect-regulation schematics conducive to minimisation and manageability of distress occurs in secure attachment, a later to resilience to stressors is observed. Insecure attachments, however, with their accompanying internalised distortion of self-concept and detrimental (under/over) appraisal of threatening events and the disproportioning of the availability of support, lead to a documented increased vulnerability to psychopathology (Schore, 2004*). Indeed, if we consider attachment theory as a theory of affect regulation and affective disorders such as depression as forms of affect dysregulation (Sroufe Waters, 1977) a link between both (attachment styles and psychopathological vulnerability) seems readily tenable. Forbes Dahl (2005), for example, suggest that depression instead of a disorder in which there is an abnormal increase in negative affect; rather is a disorder reflected in the diminished activation of positive affect systems and motivation. This aligns with definitions of its major syndromal-features i.e. anhedonia (diminished capacity for enjoyment), fatigue (diminished motivation) and social withdrawal (diminished enthusiasm). As such we might infer that strategies for minimising negative affect and increasing positive affect (established in infancy) are inefficient in some way. The authors cite many examples of studies which espouse this consideration; for example, adults with MDD have shown diminished response to positive stimuli; in some instances evincing similar responses as if it were aversive. Furthermore, depressive adults have demonstrated lower expectancy of positive events in their futures. Additionally, studies have shown how adults with anxious attachment (hyperactivation strategies); more readily access painful memories, while demonstrating exaggerated appraisal of negative events and are subsequently more vulnerable to depression (Mikulincer and Orbach, 1995). While many may criticise attachment theory as being highly pessimistic derogating the possibilities for a child who happens to present with an insecure attachment style to have a positive future free from psychopathological vulnerability, it is fair to say that it wasnt the intent of Bowlby to delineate such a deterministic perspective. Indeed, as Siegal (2001) points out, the brain is plastic throughout the lifespan and as such attachment capacities can change. Furthermore, positive social factors such as prevailing support of peers may act to alter and/or loosen implicit secondary attachment strategies. Wu (2010) for example has cited that self esteem mediates the relationship between self-concept appraisal and attachment style, therefore social factors which bolster self-esteem might be seen as re-adjusting self-appraisal thereby breaking the re-enforcing patterns of negative self-perception. In addition, while many have emphasised the maternal role in the development of such att achment patterns, others have advised that the infant can develop different attachment styles in accordance to their interactions with different people (Siegal, 2001); as such there are a number of mediating factors which imply that early insecure attachment status to one figure isnt as condemning as oft considered. To conclude: this essay has outlined how classical attachment theory, rooted in psychoanalysis, has been transformed into modern attachment theory coinciding with the recent advent of neuropsychoanalysis; that is, a branch of neuroscience dealing with the interpersonal facilitations of neurobiological development, as advocated by object relations theory and self psychology which are themselves rooted in psychoanalysis. This third revolution of psychoanalysis heralds a return to the problems once confronted by Freud namely the mind/body separation and the interface between inner and external realities, and with attempts to resolve them comes a greater alliance between psychoanalysis and mainstream science. Modern attachment theory as framework for many studies in affect (dys-)regulation have furthermore supported earlier postulations of Bowlbys and Freuds that earlier abnormal development and trauma may predict later vulnerability to psychopathology.

Comment on the development of the character of Pip Essay

We are acquainted with Pip from the outset of the novel, the opening lines telling of his unfortunate name and of the untimely deaths of his parents. To the reader, Pip appears to be a perceptive young boy- his visions about his parents were very lurid and imaginative, considering they were only taken from the font and style of his parent’s tombstones. Pip talks in a very matter of fact manner, i.e. he has no feelings of sadness or guilt when he talks about both his parents and his brothers. His encounter with the convict is a catalyst for change in Pips character, we can see that he changes from being quite confident and sure of himself, to being paranoid and afraid. When Pip hears the guns of the prison-ships, he begins to worry quite spontaneously, and links the fact that a convict has escaped with his encounter in the graveyard. This makes Pip even more fearful, seeing as now he has no doubt that the convict will carry out the necessary incisions to take out his heart and liver, unless of course Pip delivers the food. After the drop off has been made, Pip’s character takes another turn, this time into the realms of paranoia. Straight after Pip came back to his house in chapter four, Pip’s first words were ‘I fully expected to find a constable in the kitchen, waiting to take me up.’ All the way through the Christmas dinner when Pip’s relatives were present, Pip was constantly on the edge of his seat- ready to hide under the table every time Mrs. Gargery left the room, his fears about the missing food and drink riding high in his hyper-paranoid state. When Pumblechook informed Pip of his imminent visit to Miss Havisham’s, Pip is filled with questions to do with the purpose of his visit, and we see the deeply inquisitive side of Pip. His visit and time there bred mixed feelings within Pip: feelings of shame, ungratefulness, jealousy and a very prominent inadequacy within himself. He wishes he had Estella for himself, he wishes he had Miss Havisham’s fortune and he wishes he was someone else. He wishes he was someone uncommon, and someone well educated, gentlemanly and with fair hands. These wishes and strong feelings awakened his inadequacy and thus inadvertently his expectations. Estella sets an inner turmoil into motion within Pip. He feels strong feelings of love, jealousy, dislike for her (and himself) and an intuition which says leave her well alone, while his reckless love for her is in direct conflict with this. His love for her is a mystery to even himself, he analyses scrupulously his interactions with her, and the cold and heartless things she does to him, and he himself cannot explain the feelings he has towards her. Pip’s expectations change the way Pip thinks. He no longer looks upon himself as common and due to a few hints here and there from Miss Havisham, is convinced that she is his secret benefactor and that she has set him and Estella up for each other. This knowledge that Pip thinks he has leads to a change in Pip’s character, whereas before he was thinking of ways to improve himself so that Estella would look more kindly upon him, he now thinks that he just has to sit back, relax and wait. The truth was a shock to Pip, in his own words: ‘The abhorrence in which I held the man, the dread I had of him, the repugnance with which I shrank from him, could not have been exceeded if he had been some terrible beast.’ His foolishness with which he had treated Estella became apparent and inwardly Pip wished he had done more. He became both guilty and ashamed, and he came to almost resent his good fortunes, close to but not.

French Existentialism Philosophers Essay

Gabriel Marcel is known to be one of the more religious philosophers who was a French Existentialist. He was a committed Catholic Philosopher and he believed that by being connected to others he will be connected to god. He believed that philosophy should be about hope and wanted to portray the more positive aspects of human characteristics through his writings and thoughts. Marcel has a belief that problems and mysteries were two separate ideas where problems exist outside and apart from ourselves and mysteries were unsolved queries that were more internal to one’s self. For example determining what a body is, is a problem and determining what my body is, is a mystery. He believes that we can use primary and secondary reflections in order to seek a solution to the problem or mystery being faced with. Primary reflections use analytical skills to separate the thinker from the problematic object in order to find a resolution. Separating the thinker from the problem is important in order to effectively reflect and create intellectual and moral means to a solution. Primary reflections use means of abstracting data and using it in order to manipulate the world and deal with the problem that is not always black and white or a right or wrong answer. Primary reflection approaches problems from an objective standpoint where the thinker is separate from the problem while the secondary reflection begins with the experience of existence within the problem and is used with reflection of a mystery. The secondary reflection is open to contemplation by looking at it as a unique presence. The existence within the world is not a problem that needs to be solved because humans and their bodies are intrinsically related to the world and they are in relation to each other, not objects or problems that can be manipulated. Marcel believed that Philosophy is a part of reflecting on a mystery and the mystery requires participation of the person reflecting because it is an experience of presence itself. A mystery involves you as an intrinsical part of the question which is a question of yourself and requires a solution by secondary reflection. A question becomes a mystery when it takes itself into the subject. Marcel believes that humans are increasingly becoming defined by their problems which cause alienation of themselves from themselves and also causing separation from others. The questions of â€Å"being† and humans are mysteries within the Marcel philosophies. When something is recognized as â€Å"not being† it cannot be a mystery. As humans we have a need for â€Å"being† with â€Å"ontological exigence† which consumes â€Å"being† upsurges of joy, happiness, hopefulness, expectations and desires. â€Å"Being† as a human means existing and experiencing the world and the subjects within it. Having something means exercising power over that thing by possession and rights to those possessions. By having rights over a possession can also enables that person to have the ability of disposal of that subject as well. Having something is different from experiencing that thing, for example having a body is different form experiencing your body because you cannot rid yourself of your body without ceasing to be. Life is not identical to a person’s â€Å"being† because â€Å"being† is the whole self which is more than life and it is what a person aspires to be. Humans can only evoke the fullness of â€Å"being† by engaging with others and coming together as a community. Marcel promotes the idea of living I-Thou which opens up and enhances a person’s â€Å"being† which God being the ultimate Thou. The I-Thou idea requires a person to be open to the â€Å"being† of others within their lives and not living only for themselves. Marcel has an interesting stance on the subject of love and how it should be defined. He believes that love has to do with inner subjectivity and it is about seeking and experiencing the â€Å"being† of the other. Love is not about possession or having another person which is commonly thought to be the main definition of what love means. Marcel believes that a self does not love, but it is the self that is constituted by love. When we attach predicates to a thou we limit our love for another and it’s trust and faith which constitutes love in the â€Å"being† of the other. I always thought that love had to do with possessing and labeling a person or subject as yours. However, Marcel’s philosophy on love has changed my point of view into believing that love is about fully accepting a person as who they are instead of trying to possess them and changing them into being an object of your desire and control. Part B: In Simone Beauvoir’s writing of The Ethics of Ambiguity she begins to elaborate on ethics and the importance of a moral obligation to overcome oppression. Moral acts and willing one’s self free is an obligation of a person in order to become a moral person. With moral freedom a person is not free unless they can deal with free individuals. We all should strive for our freedom as well as the freedom of others and the freedom of all. The freedom to choose is shaped by social and political freedom of people. Beauvoir believes that in order to free all we must take a stand for justice especially in the political sense. We ought to respect freedom when it serves freedom, but not when freedom distances itself from itself. For example when freedom is used in the oppression and the abuse of others, we ought not to respect it in cases such as a dictatorship oppressing the freedom of its people. Oppressing an oppressor is justified even when it requires violence and in cases of people rising up and rebelling the person or the system that has been oppressing them it is justifiable. In such cases casualties of war with sacrifices is justified when fighting for freedom because it makes it a just war. Simone Beauvoir states â€Å"the truth is that if division and violence define war, the world has always been at war and will always be; if man is waiting for universal peace in order to establish his existence validly, he will wait indefinitely: there will never be any other future. † (Beauvoir ) With this she means that if the only reasons for war are for violence to annihilate the other opponent because of division then war will never end and people will never reach complete liberation. However, oppressing and oppressor should never be driven by blind faith. The actions must be considered fully well and deliberate over choice. Each circumstance should be considered on a case by case basis and analyzed by practical problems. Ethics emphasize physical and social interaction in relation to other human beings because of freedom. Authentic morality involves engagement with the world that is not abstract intellectualism. People who sit by and talk about the problems and the circumstances that accustom the world are not engaging with the world directly. Beauvoir stresses that in order to achieve authentic morality people must do something to engage with the world not intellectualize the problems within it. Humans have a moral commitment to liberate the oppressed individuals because it causes limited liberation of their own freedom. Oppressed individuals may not even know that they are being oppressed and this why it is important for others to enlighten them and help them become liberated from their situation. With an oppressed individual, their own judgment that they are oppressed is what counts and this is why it’s an obligation of others who recognize the oppression to give them knowledge of their situation. Oppressed people are cut off from the future without the power of liberation to decide what is next for them in their lives. With liberation a person must be able to question values and oppressed individuals are not able to do this. Being oppressed does not gain moral character because character is not built by suffering. A person cannot say that they are a strong person because they have been accepting oppression and the suffering that comes with it. A person is strong when they take a stand for their liberation and fight for their own values as well as the liberation of others. However, power is limited within liberation, Beauvoir enforces this by stating that â€Å"to be free is not to have the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the given toward an open future; the existence of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of my own freedom. † (Beauvoir ) Power is a foundation of moral freedom and in order to engage the world a person must have power, but it is a limited power. Not only individuals of the world, but state also has an obligation to ensure that it’s people have a minimum level of well-being because this is necessary to freely act within the world. External help is needed in order to alleviate oppression and once an oppressed individual is placed within the presence of freedom they must pursue freedom for themselves and one cannot force freedom upon them or it would not be recognized as freedom at all. Works cited Beauvoir, S. D. The Works of Simone de Beauvoir. Zuubooks. com, 2010. Print. Marcel, Gabriel. A Gabriel Marcel Reader. 1st edition. St. Augustines Press, 2011. Print.

The Permissable Nature of Cloning Illustrated in Jennifer...

In â€Å"Jennifer and Rachel,† Lee M. Silver argues that reproductive cloning deems permissible to those who encourage it, as opposed to those who reject it and don’t want to run the risk of how they’ll look in the eyes of society. Jennifer, an independent career driven woman, believes that the best way to have a baby of her own at her age is by cloning. Silver’s description of the cloning procedure is done by retrieving cells from the willing adult; prepare the cells for merging to unfertilized eggs, and then the embryos that develop successfully will be introduced to the uterus of the willing adult. Jennifer partakes in the cloning procedure and it was successful. Nine months later on March 15, 2050, Rachel was born. Silver believes†¦show more content†¦They aren’t the ones that control cloning. Silver believes that cloning will be available in one place, if banned in another place. Thus, international borders will definitely not in hibit the various reproductive practices of individuals and couples. In today’s society, people have the right to whether or not they want to reproduce. The actions partaken in, in order to reproduce is also a right earned. Silver states that once human cloning was introduced, it then opened up new perspectives of the entire reproductive choice. Silver clarifies that over time, reproductive choice has been interpreted to mean that people have the right to be or not to be genetic parents. Silver thinks that relatively few people will want to raise clones of famous, talented individuals because what most people want more than anything is to have their own child. Cloned children, like many other children, will be pushed into a certain direction against their will by their parents. However, clones don’t have the same motivation to apply themselves to tasks given to them. On the contrary, there will be those who will want to clone just for the opportunity to raise a c hild who has a high rate of being gorgeous and smart, without the longing to profit from their child’s looks and brains themselves.